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Byrtus: Constitutional Law/Criminal Procedure - Changes in the Supreme Co
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Changes in the Supreme
Court's View of Trial by Jury. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).

In May 1977, Wrestle, Inc. and Daniel W. Burch,
president of the corporation, were arrested in New Orleans
and each charged with two counts of the crime of obscenity
for displaying "hard core sexual conduct."' A jury found
both defendants guilty, but a poll of the jury revealed that
while the vote against Wrestle, Inc. had been unanimous,
the vote against Burch was five to one.2 The verdicts were
proper under Louisiana law,' and no issue regarding them
was raised in the trial court. After the trial but prior to
argument on appeal the United States Supreme Court issued
its opinion in Ballew v. Georgia in which it unanimously
agreed that a five member jury violates the right to jury
trial guaranteed by the Constitution.4 On appeal to the
Louisiana Supreme Court Burch's attorney argued that
Ballew meant that Louisiana's constitutional provision allowing a five vote conviction was contrary to the federal Constitution.' The court rejected this contention and concluded
that there was no reason to rule against the presumed
federal constitutionality of the state's constitution.'
The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed.
In a majority opinion for the Court, Justice Rehnquist reviewed and summed up prior right-to-jury-trial cases: "We
have thus held that the Constitution permits juries of less
than 12 members, but that it requires at least six. And we
Copyright@ 1980 by the University of Wyoming

1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106 (West); State v. Wrestle, Inc., 360 So.2d
831, 833 (La. 1978). The display was by means of coin operated projectors which allowed viewing of films on a small screen on the wall of
a booth.
2. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 132 (1979).
3. Art. 1, § 17 of the Louisiana Constitution provides in part: "A case in
which the punishment may be confinement at hard labor or confinement
without hard labor for more than six months shall be tried before a
jury of six persons, five of whom must concur to render a verdict." Burch
received two consecutive seven month sentences which were suspended in
lieu of two years inactive probation for each sentence on condition that
he pay $1000 to the judicial expense fund. Wrestle, Inc. was fined $600
on each count. State v. Wrestle, Inc., supra note 1.
4. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). The Court struck down Georgia's
law allowing unanimous five person verdicts but did not agree on an
opinion. For Georgia law see: GA. CONST. art. VI, § 16, 1 (1945), codified
as GA. CODE ANN. § 2-5101; now art. VI, § 15, 1 (Const. 1976), codified as
GA. CODE ANN. § 2-4401 (1977).
5. The Louisiana Supreme Court allowed the argument as "error patent on
the face of the proceedings." State v. Wrestle, supra note 1, at 837.
6. Id. at 838.
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have approved the use of certain nonunanimous verdicts in
cases involving 12-person juries.! Turning to the case before
the Court, the Justice noted that it:
lies at the intersection of our decisions concerning
jury size and unanimity. As in Batlew, we do not
pretend the ability to discern a priori a bright line
below which the number of jurors participating in
the trial or in the verdict would not permit the jury
to function in the manner required by our prior
cases. But having already departed from the strictly
historical requirements of jury trial, it is inevitable
that lines must be drawn somewhere if the substance of the jury trial right is to be preserved.'
The line drawn overruled the Louisiana Supreme Court
because for "much the same reasons that led us in Ballew"
to decide that five member juries threaten "the fairness of
the proceeding and the proper role of the jury" the present
conviction "presents a similar threat to preservation of the
substance of the jury trial guarantees. . . ."' On this basis
the Court reversed the conviction of Burch and affirmed
that of Wrestle, Inc."°
The opinion was brief (9 pages) and lacked an
analysis of the issue before the Court. No rationale was
given for the decision other than the brief reference to
Ballew, and it is not helpful. The survey of prior cases had
described Ballew as having decided that a jury of five in a
nonpetty trial raises "sufficiently substantial doubts as to
the fairness of the proceeding and proper functioning of
the jury to warrant drawing the line at six."" Thus, the
7. Burch v. Louisiana, supra note 2, at 137, citations omitted.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 138. Justice Stevens. concurred because he agreed with the Court's
resolution of the question "whether conviction by, a nonunanimous sixperson jury of a nonpetty -offense violates the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 139-40. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart
and Marshall, agreed that the conviction must be reversed "as a violation
of his right to jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 140. These Justices dissented in part because they would
have reversed both convictions on the grounds that the obscenity statute
was unconstitutional.
10. Id. at 139. On remand the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the
conviction of Wrestle, Inc. and reversed and.remanded that of Burch.
State v. Wrestle, Inc., 371 So.2d 1165, 1166 (1979).
11. Id. at 137.
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terms of Ballew were simply repeated in Burch without
explanation. In addition, although the Court in Ballew had
unanimously agreed as to the result, the opinion in the case
represented the views of only two justices" and stated
that it relied on "the principles ennunciated in Williams v.
Florida."'" Finally, although the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution were mentioned in Burch, they
were not discussed; nor was the Court's holding stated
in terms of them.14 Since Duncan v. Louisiana" had held that
the sixth amendment's right to jury trial is "fundamental"
and applicable to the states, the absence of discussion is
particularly noticeable.
Although these omissions are significant, more disturbing is that they suggest that an issue regarding a right
protected by the Constitution can be settled by the Court
doing little more than exercising its judgment and drawing
a line without reference to principles and application of
them to the issue. The omissions were not accidental. They
are consisted with a significant shift in the Court's approach to the right to jury trial which has occurred over the
last decade. As indicated in the portions of the opinion
quoted above, the shift has been from a historical view of
12. The opinion in the case by Justice Blackmun was concurred in only by
Justice Stevens. It held that "the 5-member jury does not satisfy the
jury trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth . . ." Ballew v. Georgia, supra note 4, at 228.
The holding was agreed with by Justice Brennan who was joined by
Justices Stewart and Marshall. Id. at 246. Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, specifically refused to join the
opinion because it "assumes full incorporation of the Sixth Amendment,
by the Fourteenth Amendment" contrary to their views. Id. They also
expressed "reservations as to the wisdom" of the opinion's "heavy reliance
on numerology." Id. Justice White concurred in the judgment on the limited
ground that a jury fewer than six persons did not satisfy the fair crosssection requirement of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 245.
Thus, while the entire Court agreed in the judgment and a majority
agreed as to the holding, the opinion itself represented the views of only
two Justices.
13. Ballew v. Georgia, supra note 4, at 224.
14. Although the concurring opinions clearly stated the Court's conclusion in
terms of the sixth and fourteenth amendments, the majority opinion did
not. The opinion mentioned the amendments three times, but each time
for a specific purpose: first to note that certiorari was granted to consider
whether Louisiana law violated the right to trial by jury guaranteed by
the amendments, Burch v. Louisiana, supra note 2, at 131-32; second,
to state that the issue was argued before the Louisiana Supreme Court,
Id. at 133; and, third, to state the holding of Duncan v. Louisiana, Id. at
134. The two amendments were also mentioned in footnotes describing
concurring opinions.
15. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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the right, to one in which the "function" of the jury and
the "substance" of the right are the focus of discussion. The
purpose of this note is to examine and critique that shift
and, in doing so, provide an explanation of the omissions
and the brevity of the Burch opinion. Since the history of
cases to be discussed ranges from Duncan, decided in 1968
while Chief Justice Warren was still in office, to Burch,
decided under Chief Justice Burger, a result of the discussion will be to show how the present Court has substantially
altered one area of Constitutional law.
I.

THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL PRIOR TO

Duncan

The United States Constitution contains two provisions
regarding the right to jury trial in criminal trials. Article 3,
Section 2, clause 3 provides that: "The trial of all crimes,
except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury . . .." The
sixth amendment provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial . . .. 16
The earliest cases interpreting these provisions were
concerned with when and where the right obtained and not
the particulars of the right." When the issues of unanimity
and size were finally brought to the Court, it had little
trouble disposing of them. The question whether the right
included a requirement of a unanimous verdict was first
raised in a civil case in 1897."8 The Utah territorial legislature had enacted a statute which allowed nine members
of a civil jury to render a verdict. Finding that the U.S.
Constitution applied to the territory, the Court first determined that the defendant had a seventh amendment right
to trial by jury and then stated that "unanimity was one
of the peculiar and essential features of trial by jury at the
16. In addition, the seventh amendment provides: "In suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved . .. .
17. Callen v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (right to jury trial applies in the
District of Columbia); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879) (dictum
that a state may give no right to a jury trial and not offend the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92
U.S. 90 (1875) (seventh amendment applies only in federal courts) ; see
also Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866).
18. Am. Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897).
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common law. No authorities are needed to sustain this
proposition."19 When the issue of jury size arose a year
later,"0 only a slightly longer discussion was needed to decide
that "the supreme law of the land required that he should
be tried by a jury composed of not less than twelve persons."2 1
The brevity with which the Court disposed of the issues
in these cases reflects the obvious nature the right was
thought to have. The requirements of a jury of twelve and
unanimity of verdict had been well established in England,
followed in the colonies, and adopted by the federal and
state courts. As with other Constitutional provisions, the
Court viewed the sixth and seventh amendments as preserving the rights which had been present at common law.
Questions could be quickly settled by referring to no lesser
authority than Blackstone."
This approach continued and by 1930, when the issue
of whether a twelve member jury could be waived was
brought to the Court, the meaning of the phrase "trial by
jury" seemed so well settled that the Court could declare
that its meaning was:
A trial by jury as understood and applied at
common law and includes all the essential elements
as they were recognized in this country and England
when the Constitution was adopted, is not open to
question. Those elements were: (1) That the jury
should consist of twelve men, neither more nor less;
(2) that the trial should be in the presence and
under the superintendence of a judge having power
to instruct them as to the law and advise them in
19. Id. at 468.
20. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
21. Id. at 349-50. Cf. the Court's comment concerning unanimity at 355. In
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) the requirement was held not to
apply to the states. See the Court's comment on unanimity and twelve
member juries at 586. Accord, Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516
(1905).
22. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 117 (1970) (concurring opinion).
23. "But the founders of the English law have, with excellent forecast, contrived that . . . the truth of every accusation whether preferred in the
shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors,
indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349-50, quoted in Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 15, at 151-52.
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respect of the facts; and (3) that the verdict should
be unanimous. 4
II.

THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN
DUNCAN V. LOUISIANA

The Duncan Court did not see itself as changing the
right to jury trial but expanding it. The days when the
Court had consistently refused to extend provisions of the
Bill of Rights to the states had long since passed, and the
incorporationist approach (applying provisions of the amendments to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment) had become well established.2 The
approach was not without its opponents and was vigorously
debated and criticized in Duncan as well as other opinions. -0
Gary Duncan had been convicted of simple battery
under a Louisiana law which provided a maximum penalty
of two years imprisonment.2 Under the Louisiana Constitution non-capital crimes carrying penalties of imprisonment without hard labor were to be tried by a judge without a jury." The issue before the United States Supreme
Court was whether or not the sixth and fourteenth amendments secured the right to jury trial in state criminal prosecutions. 2 ' After briefly reviewing other portions of the Bill
of Rights which had been held to apply to the states and the
relevant fifth and sixth amendment standards for review,
the Court held that "the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they
come within the Sixth
to be tried in a federal court-would
80°
guarantee.
Amendment's
24. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930) (dictum).
25. See e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion), and see the history of the fourteenth amendment provided in the
opinion's Appendix A at 92.
26. See e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (concurring
opinion).
27. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:35 (West 1950).
28. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41 (1948). The provision has since been amended.
29. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 15, at 147. Cf. Duncan's companion case,
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
30. Id. at 149. The holding was agreed upon by seven Justices. They, however,
disagreed upon the theory by which the sixth amendment was to be applied
to the states. Four held the selective incorporation doctrine expressed by
Justice White in the plurality opinion. Justice Black. joined by Justice
Douglas, agreed that the sixth amendment had indeed been incorporated
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Although unanimity and jury size were not directly at
issue in Duncan, they were central to the argument before
the Court and engendered considerable controversy within
it. Louisiana had expressed concern that an adverse decision
would mean that it and other states would need to comply
with these federal requirements. Indeed, given a Court
dominated by the incorporationist approach, there was no
reason to think that this would not be the case. Only a few
years earlier the Court had made clear that it rejected "the
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States
only a 'watered-down, subjective version of the individual
guarantees of the Bill of Rights' ..
The Court did not rule directly on the question, but
responded in a footnote that "it seems very unlikely to us
that our decision today will require widespread changes in
state criminal processes."" Two reasons were given for the
statement. They were that sixth amendment decisions "are
always subject to reconsideration" and that the impact of
the Duncan decision would be minimal because only four
states allowed juries of fewer than twelve to sit without a
defendant's consent and only two states allowed less-thanunanimous convictions for crimes with penalties of imprisonment greater than one year." While not stating that
unanimous verdicts and twelve member juries are required
of the states, these comments indicate that such, indeed,
was to be the effect of the holding unless matters underwent "reconsideration."
At least some Justices were ready to do just that.
Evidence of the depth of the controversy on the Court and
the importance of the footnote can be found in Justice
by the fourteenth, but made clear that this was so because the entire
Bill of Rights had been made applicable by the passage of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 162, 166. Justice Fortas concurred, but did so on the
basis that the due process clause requires the right to jury trial because
the right is fundamental. Bloom v. Illinois, eupra note 29, at 211-12. That
the sixth amendment guaranteed the right in federal cases was, for him,
not conclusive, but a "powerful reason" for determining that the right was
fundamental. Id. at 212.
31. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964), quoting from Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
32. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 15, at 158 n. 30.
33. Id.
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Fortas's concurring opinion and Justice Harlan's dissent.
Justice Fortas disapproved of the footnote. He disagreed
with its "implication" that requiring the states to accord
the right to a jury trial meant "importing" the "ancillary
rules" which accompany the right." Specifically he stated:
Neither logic nor history nor the intent of the
draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment can possibly be said to require that the Sixth Amendment
or its jury trial provision be applied to the States
together with the total
5 gloss that this Court's
decisions have applied."
Justice Harlan was even more direct in his criticism. His
dissenting opinion was primarily devoted to attacking the
incorporationist approach and defending "fundamental fairness" as the standard by which due process limitations on
the states are to be determined. 8 On the Duncan issue he
reproached the majority because "It has simply assumed
that the question before us is whether the Jury Trial Clause
of the Sixth Amendment should be incorporated into the
Fourteenth, jot-for-jot and case-for-case, or ignored."87
Thus, Duncan, when read in light of incorporationist
theory and the statements of those Justices who disagreed
with its holding, seems to have been a case in which those
on the Court thought that they were not only deciding that
states must provide a jury in criminal trials whenever the
sixth amendment requires, but also deciding that a Constitutional jury must consist of twelve members who must
render a unanimous verdict.

III.
A.

THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL AFTER DUNCAN

Williams v. Florida

Despite the views of the members of the Court at the
time of Duncan, when the issue of twelve member juries was
34.
35.
36.
37.

Bloom v. Illinois, supra note 29, at 213 (concurring opinion).
Id.
Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 15, at 179-80.
Id. at 181. Both Justice Harlan's and Justice Fortas's views followed from
the "fundamental fairness" approach they shared in common. Under it the
specific practice was examined to see whether it was necessary toprotect
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brought to it two years later in Williams v. Florida"
reconsideration became reality. The case presented the Court
with a challenge to the constitutionality of a Florida statute
allowing six member juries. As the subsequent reliance of
Burch on Ballew and Ballew on Williams has made clear,
the "principles" of Williams are important. They, however,
are not a set of standards to be applied to an issue, but
the method used by Justice White to reach the result.
The opinion was set within the framework of Duncan
and its application of the sixth amendment to the states
through the fourteenth. Section II, in which the issue of
jury size was first discussed, began by stating both the
holding of Duncan and the ultimate holding of Williams in
terms of the amendments." The opinion also concluded by
repeating that "petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights, as
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment
were not violated by" the six member jury. 0
Within this framework of incorporationist language lay
the method. It consisted, first, of a lengthy and extensively
footnoted discussion of the development of the right to trial
by jury and the drafting of the sixth amendment. On the
basis of his examination of history, Justice White concluded
that the number twelve appeared to be "a historical accident, unrelated to the great purposes which gave rise to the
jury in the first place."4 He next asked whether this accidental feature "has been immutably codified into our Constitution."4 Finding from his account of the adoption of
the sixth amendment that "there is absolutely no indication . . . of an explicit decision to equate the constitutional
and common-law characteristics of the jury," he turned to
"other than purely historical considerations to determine

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

"liberty" under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. They
arrived at opposite sides in Duncan because Justice Fortas concluded that
a jury trial was required, while Justice Harlan, along with Justice Stewart
who joined him, concluded that it was not.
Williams v. Florida, supra note 22.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 90.
Compare, Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 81728 (1976).
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which features of the jury system, as it existed
at common
44
law, were preserved in the Constitution."
The second part of the method was the discussion of
"other" considerations. The test Justice White established
was that of determining whether the feature of jury trial
under consideration performs some function in meeting the
purposes of trial by jury," in particular preventing "oppression by the Government."4
Given this purpose, the essential feature of a jury
obviously lies in the interposition between the
accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community
participation and shared responsibility that results
from 47
that group's determination of guilt or innocence.
The Justice immediately noted that the jury's "performance of this role is not a function of the particular
number" of the jury."' He then went on to discuss several
other matters which might require a jury composed of a
particular number. The jury should "probably" be large
enough "to promote group deliberation" and "provide a fair
possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the
community."4 These considerations were dismissed with
the comment that "we find little reason to think" that they
are "in any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved"
with six rather than twelve member juries." "And certainly,
the reliability of the jury as a factfinder hardly seems to be a
function of its size." The next question discussed was
whether or not a twelve member jury gave the defendant
44. Williams v. Florida, supra note 22, at 99.
45. Id. at 99-100.
46. Id. at 100. The purpose is taken from Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 15,
at 155-56.
47. Id. As explained in Duncan the right to jury trial was included in the
Constitution because those who wrote the amendment "knew from history
and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal
charges . . . ." In particular, they feared "judges too responsive to the
voice of higher authority," "biased or eccentric" judges, and "the corrupt
or overzealous prosecutor." Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 15, at 156.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 100-101.
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greater chances of acquittal. This concern was met with
the observation that "what few experiments have occurredusually in the civil area-indicate that there is no discernable difference between the results reached by the two
different-sized juries." 2 Finally, Justice White stated that
while "in theory the number of viewpoints represented on
a randomly selected jury" ought to be greater with a twelve
member jury, "in practice the difference . . .seems likely
to be negligible."5 "
Having thus raised, defined, and disposed of the purposes and functions of jury trial, the Justice concluded that
"the fact that the jury at common law was composed of
precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect
and wholly without signifthe purposes of the jury system
'54
mystics'.
to
'except
icance
Cases after Williams
The method used by Justice White in Williams has been
followed, with some variation, in subsequent jury trial cases.
When the issue of unanimity of juries in state criminal

B.

55
trials was brought to the Court in Apodaca v. Oregon,

Justice White again wrote the opinion." Again he referred
to Duncan and the sixth and fourteenth amendments to
state the claim on which certiorari was granted, but he immediately turned to a discussion of Williams. 7 Comparing the
52. Id. at 101. Six sources are cited in support of the statement in n. 48.
53. Id. at 102.
54. Id.
55. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion). The outcome
is peculiar. The opinion represents the views of Justices White (its author),
Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger. While agreeing that the
sixth amendment applies uniformly to federal and state courts, they find
that unanimity is not required. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas
in separate dissenting opinions would also have applied the sixth amendment to the states but dissented because they believed unanimity to be
required by the sixth amendment. Justice Stewart found unanimity to be
required but based his conclusion on the fourteenth amendment. Justice
Powell agreed that unanimity was required, but only of the federal government. Thus, while seven Justices held the view that the sixth amendment
applies to state and federal governments equally, and five agreed that the
Constitution requires unanimous verdicts, the Court held that unanimous
verdicts are not required in state criminal trials.
56. Justice White also wrote the opinion in Apodaca's companion case, Johnson
v. Louisiana, supra note 26. Since the trial in Johnson occurred prior to
Duncan and Duncan was held not to apply retroactively, DeStefano v.
Woods, Sheriff, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), Johnson is not a sixth amendment
case and is not discussed in this note.
57. Apocada v. Oregon, supra note 55, at 406.
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history of jury unanimity with the history of the twelve
member jury, the Justice found there to be no clear indication of intent" and, so, moved to "other than purely
historical considerations.""9 The inquiry, he stated, "must
focus upon the function served by the jury in contemporary
society."' The purpose of preventing oppression by imposing "the common sense judgment of a group of laymen" was again given, and again the conclusion followed
that "A requirement of unanimity . . . does not materially
contribute to the exercise of this commonsense judgment."'"
Only slight variations in the approach appeared in
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Colgrove v. Battin."2
It began by examining the history of the adoption of the
seventh amendment, and, because the Justice found the
amendment's purpose to have been "preserving the right
of trial by jury in civil cases where it existed at common law, rather than the various incidents,""8 he concluded that, quoting Williams, "history reveals no intention
on the part of the Framers 'to equate the constitutional and
common-law characteristics of the jury'." 4 The Justice then
discussed whether or not a jury of twelve is part "of the
substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.""5 Since
the purpose of jury trial was "to prevent government oppression" in criminal cases and to "assure a fair and equitable
resolution of factual issues" in both criminal and civil cases,
he said, "the question comes down to whether jury performance is a function of jury size."6 " Noting that Williams
had rejected this idea and that "nothing has been suggested
to lead us to alter that conclusion," Justice Brennan concluded that "it cannot be said that twelve members is a
substantive aspect of the right of trial by jury." 7 Finally,
the Justice turned to "the question whether a jury of six
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 408-10.
Id. at 410.
Id.
Id.
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 156, Williams v. Florida, supra note 22, at 99.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id.
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satisfies the Seventh Amendment guarantee of 'trial by
jury'." 8 He noted that the conclusion of Williams that there
was "no discernible difference"" between the two sizes of
juries had inspired a number of studies of jury decision
making. Acknowledging them by means of a long footnote,
the Justice stated that none of them "persuades us to depart
from the conclusion reached in Williams, ' 70 and concluded
that a jury of six satisfies the seventh amendment's
guarantee. 1
In Ballew v. Georgia" the issue presented to the Court
was the constitutionality of five member juries in state
criminal trials. The Court in Williams had expressly reserved this issue. 3 The opinion in Ballew by Justice Blackmun began with the statement that it followed the "principles ennunciated in Williams v. Florida."4 The issue of the
case, 5 the argument at trial,76 the argument on state appeal, 7
and the case's holding" were set forth in terms of the sixth
and fourteenth amendments. Duiwan was described as having
held that the right to jury trial was "fundamental" and as
applying the sixth amendment to the states.7 But the opinion's discussion was of Williams. The purpose of the jury in
preventing oppression was repeated, as were the needs that
the jury should be of sufficient size to promote group deliberation, provide reliability of verdicts, and provide a representative cross-section.8"
To find whether a five member jury met these requirements, Justice Blackmun turned to studies of jury and small
group deliberation processes. Both Williams and Colgrove
had referred to such studies, but they were discussed for the
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 158.
Id., Williams v. Florida, supra note 22, at 101.
Id. at 159. The studies are listed in n. 15.
Id. at 160.
Ballew v. Georgia, supra note 4, at 224.
Id. at 230, Williams v. Florida, supra note 22, at 91 n. 28.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id. at 226, 227.
Id.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 229, see also at 224 n. 1.
Id. at 230.
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first time in Ballew. "They raise," the Justice stated, "significant questions about the wisdom and constitutionality of
a reduction below six."'" In discussing the studies he presented five points. First, "progressively smaller juries are
less likely to foster effective group deliberation." 2 Second,
the data "raise doubts about the accuracy achieved by smaller
and smaller panels."'" Third, in criminal cases the variance
in jury verdicts between smaller and larger juries "amounts
to an imbalance to the detriment of . . . the defense."8 "
Fourth, as juries decrease in size there are problems with
"the representation of minority groups in the community."8 5
And, fifth, methodological problems which tend "to mask
differences in the operation of smaller and larger juries"
have been found in the research.8" The outcome was that:
While we adhere to, and reaffirm our holding
of Williams v. Florida, these studies ... lead us to
conclude that the purpose and functioning of the
jury in a criminal trial is seriously impaired, and
to a constitutional degree, by a reduction in size to
below six members. We readily admit that we do
not pretend to discern a clear line between six
members and five. But the assembled data raise
substantial doubt about the reliability and appropriate representation of panels smaller than six. 7
IV.

A.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S APPROACH

The Development from Duncan to Burch

In Duncan the United States Supreme Court extended
the sixth amendment's right to jury trial to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Given the facts before
the Court, the holding was only that states are constitutionally required to provide a jury trial. However, given
the incorporationist views of the Duncan majority, the
historical content the right was thought to have, the
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 232.
at 234.
at 236.
at 237.
at 239.
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Court's rejection of "watered down" versions of constitutional rights, and the debate within the Duncan Court, it is
clear that the Court meant to extend the full right to the
states. Nevertheless, because of the kind of case before the
Court subsequent cases have been able to find the phrase
"right to jury trial" to be more ambiguous than the
Duncan Court thought it to be.
While the approach developed in Williams and followed
in subsequent cases can be viewed as the analysis the Court
uses to examine the extent of the right incorporated, the
opinions in those cases make it clear that incorporationist
theory has little to do with the outcome of the case. Members
of the Court continue to disagree about incorporationist
theory,88 but in the context of the right to jury trial the
disagreement seems to have more to do with the statement
of the holding than the holding itself. Similarly, the recitation of the holding of Duncan appears to be little more than
ritual since that case now applies only when a defendant
has been denied a jury.
Instead, the pattern of steps developed by Justice White
in Williams constitutes the approach of the Court. The question to be asked is not what history mandates the meaning
of the amendment to be, but what preserves the "purpose"
or "function" of trial by jury. Determining whether the
feature at issue before the Court meets the "purpose" has
so far been settled by reference to jury studies. Thus, the
question of whether a particular feature of jury trial is
included within the sixth amendment's guarantee has been
made a "factual" 89 question of whether that feature is
necessary to preserve the purpose of trial by jury as defined
by the Court.
B.

The Decision in Burch

With this shift in mind, the brevity and omissions of
the opinion in Burch can be readily understood. The pattern
88. See notes 9, 12, 14, 30, and 55 8upra.
89. Although juries may be studied and factual conclusions reached, determining on the basis of such studies that particular features "preserve"
designated purposes requires interpretation of the data and judgment as
to its import.
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of prior decisions was repeated, not by repeating the steps
of the method but by a kind of shorthand in which the
decisions of prior cases are substituted for the steps.
Duncan, the sixth and fourteenth amendments, and incorporationist theory did not need to be discussed because they
were no longer relevant to the outcome of the case. No
reference to principles and discussion based upon them was
needed because the determination to be made was a "factual"
one. The brief reference to Ballew was sufficient because
the reference was to the conclusions Justice Blackmun
drew from the jury studies he described. Finally, the case
was one in which the Court had to draw a line because
it had to make the "factual" determination of whether the
"purpose" of jury trial was preserved when a jury was
allowed to render a five to one verdict."
V.

CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S APPROACH

The approach developed in Williams is clearly carried
through subsequent cases. It seems equally clear that it is
result oriented. Although the Court is the final arbiter of
the intent behind Constitutional provisions, the approach it
has taken to discover intent contains numerous flaws.
Similarly, the use the Court has made of jury studies
appears to be not only incorrect in cases prior to Ballew,
but also motivated by the conclusions to be drawn.
A.

Historical Considerations

In Williams Justice White concluded that the number
twelve was a "historical accident." 1 It was this conclusion,
combined with finding no clear intent on the part of the
drafters of the sixth amendment, that allowed him to turn
to "other than purely historical considerations."
While
there is no reason to doubt his conclusion, his investigation
90. A more pragmatic, though speculative, way of reading the opinion is as a
compromise written to elicit majority agreement. The Court in Ballew
had been sharply divided even when unanimous as to the result. See note
12 supra. Not stating the holding in terms of the sixth and fourteenth
amendments and not discussing jury studies avoided the controversial parts
of the Ballew opinion.
91. See the text accompanying note 41 supra.
92. See note 44 and the text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
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relied on a crucial assumption. It assumed that a rational
reason for the origin of the number twelve was the only
possible evidence that would support the continued use of
that number. Having set out to find such a reason, the
investigation had to fail. First, as the Justice himself
noted, 3 the number twelve was fixed by the middle of the
fourteenth century. There is scant written evidence explaining why anything was done as it was at that time.
Furthermore, it is likely that the number was gradually
settled upon rather than chosen at one time. The investigation also had to fail because it was looking in the wrong
place. "Twelve" carries no special magic. Even if contemporary explanations were available, no more rational
reasons would be given for the number than could be given
now. There may have beer, nonetheless, good and proper
reasons for preferring a jury of that size rather than one
of a much smaller or larger number. The reasons may have
been fear of juror intimidation, or the need for an appropriately small number to allow discussion and decision
making; or it may have been the need to have a sufficiently
large number to offset the harsh penalties of the time. Whatever the reason, it was not to be found by searching for a
justification for the number twelve. 4
Focusing on the origin of the number twelve also missed
what should have been an important consideration in examining the common law right to jury trial. The fact that
the number chosen was "accidental" does not mean that its
retention by first English and then American courts for
six hundred years prior to Williams was also accidental.
Subsequent history should have been more important than
the origin of the number.
Similar considerations apply to the history of the requirement of unanimity in Apodaca. Again, the origin of
the requirement may be, as Justice White noted, "shrouded
93. Williams v. Florida, supra note 22, at 87 n. 18. The Justice quotes from:
SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW 75-76 (1922).
94. Cf. Sperlich, . . And then there were six: the decline of the American jury,
63 JUDICATURE 262, 266 (1980).
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in obscurity,"" but the reasons the practice was retained and
the purposes it was thought to serve should have been
important in determining the constitutional role of unanimity. Such considerations, however, were not part of the
opinion.
The discussion of constitutional history was similarly
flawed. Determining the intent of a constitutional provision
by investigating its history is, of course, proper. However,
the nature of the investigation undertaken by Justice White
in Williams indicates that it was designed to arrive at a
particular conclusion. He concluded that "there is absolutely
no indication" of "an explicit decision" that the jury intended by the authors of the sixth amendment was to be
the common law jury2 While there is no reason to doubt
this conclusion, the standard of an "explicit decision" was so
high that it flawed the inquiry. To search for an explicit
decision is to stipulate that intent will be relevant only when
the issue before the Court is the same as, or very similar
to, one debated by the drafters of the Constitution. If the
question is the intent of the drafters, the reasonable place
to begin an investigation is with a search to find whether
there is any indication of intent. Perhaps little evidence can
be found or no strong conclusion can be drawn from the
evidence, but requiring an "explicit decision" means that in
all but the rarest case no intent will be found.
In addition, looking for an explicit decision, not finding
one, and then letting the matter rest suggests that not only
was there no decision but also no intent. It is not likely that
such was the case. If no clear intent can be discovered, it is
reasonable to assume that the provision was intended to
preserve the right as it was at the time the amendment was
adopted. It was this inference that Justice White was
attempting to avoid, and the standard of an "explicit decision" seems to have been designed to insure that this alternative was not reached.
95. Apodaca v. Oregon, supra note 55, at 407 n. 2.
96. See the text accompanying note 43 supra.
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The standard was also high enough that it allowed prior
cases to be easily dealt with. Thompson v. Utah 7 was criticized for not discussing whether "every feature of the jury
as it existed at common law . . . was necessarily included
in the Constitution.""8 Similarly, statements in all other
cases were denounced for relying "solely on the fact that
the common-law jury consisted of 12.2" The demand that
these cases provide an explanation served to cover the fact
that the statements made in them were made on the basis
of the theory that the Constitution was intended to preserve
the common law jury.' 0 Making the criticism allowed the
Justice to avoid the need to find fault with that theory.
B.

The Move to Alternate Grounds

The shift to alternative considerations and the purpose
chosen as the alternative were also designed to reach a
result. In Williams the move was described as a turn "to
other than purely historical considerations to determine" the
features of the common law jury that "were preserved in
the Constitution."'' This statement suggested that the alternative inquiry would determine some fact about the past.
Yet, the next sentence described the inquiry as determining
the function the feature performs in relation to "the purposes of the jury trial."'0 2 Such inquiry would be into the
present performance of juries. There was no logical connection between the two statements. Rather, the transition
seems intended to obscure the fact that the common law
origin of the feature would play no role in the judgment
that the feature did or did not meet the "purpose" of jury
trial. The feature discussed could as easily have been one
unknown at common law.
The purpose of jury trial selected by Justice White
is also problematic. The "safeguard from oppression"
standard was taken from Duncan, but in that case it was
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See note 26 supra and the accompanying text.
Willams v. Florida, supra note 22, at 91.
Id. at 92.
See the discussion in Section I of the text.
See the text accompanying notes 41-44 and 92 supra.
See the text accompanying note 45.
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described as the intent of the framers."0 3 Using it as the
standard by which to measure the sixth amendment's jury
trial right, was to say that we know the purpose of the
provision, but not whether the drafters believed that the
juries they used satisfied it. Although it may be that alternatives to twelve member juries and unanimous verdicts
can also meet the purpose, it is likely that, having had the
purpose in mind, the drafters believed that the common law
jury met it.
It was the shift to alternative considerations that
allowed the introduction of the idea of "purpose" and the
naming of the safeguard function as the purpose. The
choice of this standard determined the outcome of the cases.
Once selected, it was the fact that the jury was present
and not the number of its members or the unanimity of its
verdict, that satisfied the purpose by creating a barrier to
oppression. Number and verdict could be relevant to how
well the jury performed subsidiary functions, as was the
case in Ballew and presumably Burch, but not whether it
met the purpose of jury trial. The selection of the "safeguard" purpose meant that very little would be required
for a Constitutional jury. Only by referring back to the
additional functions mentioned in Williams was Justice
Blackmun in Ballew able to establish the unconstitutionality
of five member juries. Alternatives to the "safeguard"
purpose were available to Justice White in Williams."'
While a different purpose may or may not have required
a twelve member jury, the determination would have been
more difficult than with the "safeguard" purpose.
The Use of Jury Studies
However problematic Justice White's method, it has
been the use of jury studies which has led the Court into
trouble. In Williams Justice White cited six articles to
support his statement that there is "no discernible difference
between the results reached by the two different sized
C.

103. See note 47 supra.
104. A fuller discussion of this point can be found in: Singley, Ballew v. Georgia:
Five is Not Enough for What?, 52 TEMP. L. Q. 217, 231-34 (1979).
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juries..''
After the decision several articles pointed out
serious deficiencies in the studies.' They were, nevertheless, cited again in Colgrove along with other studies, including those which had been critical of them. 11 7 Colgrove's
use of studies was criticized in other articles which, along
with some of the earlier articles and later studies, than
appeared in Ballew.1 °5 The use made of studies in Ballew
has been well received." ° ' However, many of the studies
cited were comparative studies of six and twelve member
juries conducted after the Williams decision. While they
support the Court's decision that five member juries do
not operate the same as twelve member juries, they equally
support the conclusion that six member juries do not operate
the same as twelve member juries. Thus, if their use is
valid arid they are accepted by the Court, Williams and
Colgrove should be overruled."'
It seems likely that the citation of jury studies in
Williams was done for the purpose of giving credence to
the conclusions the Court wished to make. By using them,
however, the Court opened itself to criticism by those who
work in the area. It also opened itself to arguments in
subsequent cases which use other studies as well as criticisms
of the studies previously cited. Factual determinations, unlike
questions of constitutional interpretation, are not matters
the Court can rule on with finality. Nor can it declare
which studies are valid and which are not. The use of
studies as the basis for decisionmaking requires a Court
which is willing to change its decisions to accord with the
best possible data. Yet, the Supreme Court is not known as
an institution which is willing to overturn recent decisions.
105. Williams v. Florida, supra note 22, at 101. The studies are listed at 101 n. 48.
106. E.g., Zeisel,... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal
Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 710 (1971). The "data" used in Williams consisted
largely of observations by judges and attorneys and not controlled studies.
The conclusion of the article states: "the change in verdicts that might be
expected from the reduction of the twelve member jury to six members is
by no means negligible." Id. at 724.
107. Colgrove v. Battin, supra note 62, at 158 n. 13, 15, and 16.
108. Ballew v. Georgia, supra note 4, at 231 n. 10.
109. For a favorable analysis of Justice Blackmun's five points see: Sperlich,
Trial by Jury: It May Have a Future, SuP. CT. L. REV. 191, 209 (1978),
and Singly, supra note 104, at 249.
110. Id. at 218.
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Although this suggests there is a basic problem inherent
in the Court's use of jury studies or other social science
data, a more fundamental concern is the use to which such
data should be put. So far the use of jury studies has been
to establish that some feature of the jury is or is not necessary to preserve the purpose of jury trial or fill one of the
needs associated with the purpose. Justice Blackmun's statements in Ballew were of this sort. For example, his concern
in discussing whether a five member jury represents a
cross section of the community was the minimum number
necessary to meet the requirement. However, since both the
Court and the jury exist in a pluralistic, democratic society,
the concern ought to have been to find the number of jurors
which would maximize representation while maintaining a
workable system. Similarly, if data is to be used to discuss
the effectiveness of group deliberation, the reliability of
results, and possible biases built in by size, the concern
ought to be to find the features of juries which promote
their best operation and provide a maximum of fairness in
procedure. There is reason why Justice Blackmun did not
take this approach. Seeking to maximize the requirements
would have led to the conclusion that Williams and Colgrove
had been wrongly decided. Yet, not doing so suggested both
minimal concern for the preservation of juries and that the
studies were cited primarily because they supported the
conclusion to be reached.
Included in the issue of the proper use of social science
data is the question of the weight it should be given in
judicial decisionmaking. Given that the Court may be called
upon to make factual determinations about juries or similar
matters, the relevance of carefully researched information
is apparent. Strict reliance, however, is questionable. Data
collected are necessarily subject to interpretation. As research proceeds, new data may require new conclusions.
Disputes about methodology are not uncommon and developments in methodology may cast doubt on the validity of
previous research. Yet, the decisions of the Court establish
the law and define constitutional rights. One of the functions
of a system of law is to provide stability within a society.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol15/iss2/14
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Another is to allow citizens to form reasonable expectations
about their relations not only with each other but also with
their government. Res judicata is not a convenient principle
to prevent overburdening of courts, but an essential element
of a legal system based on precedent. Establishing law on the
basis of information which is subject to reevaluation introduces uncertainty. This is particularly true with the use of
jury studies since extensive work in the area has occurred
only since the decision in Williams.
Nor is it clear that constitutional law is an appropriate
area for reliance on the results of studies. Part of our
understanding of law is that there is an area of rights which
are considered so essential to our fulfillment as human
beings that they cannot be taken away from us by our
government, or even by our individual consent, but only by
the most demanding of procedures."' Placing our understanding of those rights on information which is subject to
change, criticism, and reevaluation meets neither the needs
of the society nor our understanding of rights and the
importance they have for us as human beings. If this is the
case, then the final criticism of the Court's approach is not
that its reliance on data is misplaced, but that the question
it uses the data to answer is the wrong question to ask. The
Constitution's protection of individual rights is reduced to
a question of whether features of a system serve the purposes of that system. The purpose identified may be the
protection of individuals from governmental oppression, but
asking questions about features and functions is different
from asking questions about rights. One leads to judgments
about the "factual" operation of systems, the other to judgments about human dignity and the kind of society it
requires.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In regard to the sixth amendment's right to jury trial,
the current Supreme Court has largely circumvented the
incorporationist approach of the Warren Court in Duncan.
111.

R. DWoKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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While cases may still be brought to the Court claiming
violation of the incorporated provision and the Court's
opinion will describe the Duncan holding, the decision of the
Court will have little to do with either. Although jury studies
are likely to be used in argument and considered by the
Court in its opinion, it is unclear that they will be controlling. The "safeguard" purpose of juries seems likely to
remain the formal standard used by the Court, but the
actual decision will depend more upon the Justices' perception of the fairness of the procedure.
While Ballew and Burch indicate that the Court will
not regard all procedures as fair, the "safeguard" approach
itself does not suggest what the Court may decide in future
cases. Indeed, there is as yet no indication that the "safeguard" approach has any limitations. The application of
this minimal standard to other features of trial by jury
could bring about other major changes equal to those begun
by the Court in Williams. While it is unlikely that the
present Court will reverse the positions taken in Williams,
Apodaca, and Colgrove, changes in the compostion of the
Court could lead to reconsideration of these cases.
Paul H. Byrtus
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